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Abstract 
 
Recently there has been some attention on the issue of industrial clusters and 
industrial policy claiming that there are arguments in favour of subsidising special 
industries in order to stimulate industrial agglomeration. An important objection 
against such a selective industrial policy is that the government needs full information 
about the industries to be able to pick the winners. But often the government does not 
know whether the industry is a cluster or not. If the policy towards a cluster is more 
favourable than the policy towards other industries, all industries will have incentives 
to allege to be clusters. The problem for the government is to identify the true clusters 
from the ordinary industries. This paper attempts to shed some light on the problem of 
industrial policy and industrial clusters when there is asymmetric information between 
the government and the industry. We show that a subsidy contingent of a certain 
activity level will create a separating equilibrium. 
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1. Introduction  
Recently there has been some attention on the issue of industrial clusters and 
industrial policy. Several papers claim that there are arguments in favour of 
subsidising special industries in order to stimulate industrial clusters (see f. i. Porter 
(1990), Reve et al. (1992), Reve and Jakobsen (2001) and Norman and Venables 
(2001)). An important objection against such a selective industrial policy is that the 
government needs full information about the industries to be able to pick the winners. 
But often the government does not know whether the industry is a cluster or not. In 
some cases even the industry themselves does not know to which extent the industry 
is a cluster, but in most cases the industry does know more about themselves than 
does the government. If a cluster gets a more favourable policy than other industries, 
all industries will have incentives to allege to be clusters. The problem for the 
government is to identify the true clusters from the ordinary industries. 
 
An industrial cluster is an industry with some agglomeration gains. The gains may be 
due to positive external effects such as knowledge spillovers or other real 
externalities, or it may be due to pecuniary externalities in industries with economies 
of scale and imperfect competition. There is a rich literature on industrial clusters, and 
some papers discuss policy implications 1. But no paper includes asymmetric 
information between the government and the industry. This paper attempts to shed 
some light on the problem of industrial policy and industrial clusters when there is 
asymmetric information between the government and the industry. 
  
The market failures involved are co-ordination failures and increasing return to scale 
in addition to asymmetric information. It is a complicated issue, and we have to focus 
on one problem at the time. This paper focuses on the problem of optimal scale when 
there is increasing return to scale and asymmetric information, leaving the co-
ordination problem for further research. The problem is how to design a policy that 
induces optimal scale of production when there is asymmetric information between 
the industries and the government. To solve this problem, we add asymmetric 
information into a model developed by Norman and Venables (2001). 
 
Assume that there are two industries, one with decreasing return to scale and one that 
alleges to have increasing return to scale at the national level. If the sector has 
increasing return to scale, it is called a cluster. The input factors are mobile between 
the sectors, but internationally immobile. All goods can be traded internationally. The 
countries in the world are identical in the sense that they have identical factor 
resources and identical preferences. 
 
If there is a sector with increasing return to scale, and it is common knowledge that 
the sector is a cluster, then in equilibrium some, but not all, countries will produce in 
the increasing return to scale sector2. The national income in those countries hosting a 
cluster is larger than in those countries without a cluster. Furthermore, the size of the 
clusters is too small. Therefore, each country will have an incentive to subsidise the 
clusters.  
                                                 
1 See Haaland and Wooton (1999), Baldwin and Krugman (2000), Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik and 
Schjelderup (2000), Ludema and Wooton (2000), Norman and Venables (2001), and Forslid and 
Knarvik (2002). 
 
2 See Norman and Venables (2001). 
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But what happens if there is asymmetric information between the government and the 
industries? To be specific, assume that the owners of the input factor know whether 
the sector is a cluster or not, but that the government does not know. The question is 
then: How should the government design the policy? 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model, while section 3 
discusses the various equilibria. Section 4 discusses the national income and industrial 
policy when there is no asymmetric information. In section 5 asymmetric information 
and industrial policy are discussed, while conclusions are given in the final section. 
 
 
2. The model  
Assume that there are two sectors in the economy. One sector producing a numeral 
good, y, and one sector producing a good, x, at a price p. Both sectors use only one 
input factor, called labour. The total supply of labour in a country is given by L. The 
employment in the x-sector is given by n, and the rest of the labour, L-n, is employed 
in the y-sector. 
 
Assume that the numeral good, y, is produced with a production function given by  
 
(1) y = Y(L-n), 
 
where Y’(L-n) > 0 and Y’’(L-n) < 0, which implies that there is decreasing return to 
scale in the y-sector.  
 
Assume that the x-sector alleges to be a sector with increasing return to scale (a 
cluster). The workers know whether the x-sector is a cluster or not, but the 
government does not. To make the model as simple as possible, assume that the 
technology in the x-sector could take one out of two functional forms. If the x-sector 
is not a cluster, it is common knowledge that the production function is given by x = 
X(n), where X’(n) > 0 and X’’(n) < 0. If, on the other hand, the x-sector is a cluster, it 
is common knowledge that each worker produces an output equal to a(n), which is an 
increasing and concave function, and the total production is given by x = na(n). Thus, 
summarising the production in the x-sector gives 
 
 ì X(n)  if the x-sector is not a cluster 
(2) x  = í 
î na(n) if the x-sector is a cluster. 
  
 
The income in country i, mi, is equal to the sum of the value of the production in the 
two sectors: 
 
 ì Y(L-ni) + pX(ni) if the x-sector is not a cluster 
(3) mi = í 
î  Y(L-ni) + pnia (ni) if the x-sector is a cluster. 
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The preferences in a country are assumed to be quasi- linear. The utility in country i is 
given by 
 
(4) ui = v(p) + mi,  
 
where v(p) is the indirect utility function for the x-good, which is a decreasing and 
convex function. The demand for the x-good is therefore  
 
(5) c = - v’(p). 
 
If x-sector is a cluster, generally, not all countries will have a x-sector (a cluster). 
Assume that there are K countries in the world, and k of them have a cluster. The rest 
of the countries, K-k, specialise in the y-sector. The world marked for goods will clear 
when the total demand is equal to the total supply of x-goods, that is 
 
  ì KX(n) if x-sector is not a cluster 
(6) -Kv’(p) = í 
î  kna(n) if x-sector is a cluster. 
  
 
If the x-sector is not a cluster, equation (6) implies that the world market price, p, is a 
function of the employment in the x-sector only. If, on the other hand, the x-sector is a 
cluster, equation (6) implies that the world market price, p, is a function of both the 
relative number of countries hosting a cluster and the employment in the clusters. 
Equation (7) summarises this.  
 
 ì P(n)   if the x-sector is not a cluster 
(7) p  = í 
î F(k/K, n)  if the x-sector is a cluster, 
  
 
where the partial derivative is negative with respect to all arguments (see appendix 1), 
which implies that if the x-sector is not a cluster, the world market price will fall when 
the employment, and thereby the production, rises. Furthermore, if the x-sector is a 
cluster, equation (7) implies that the world market price will fall if the number of 
clusters in the world rises or if the employment in the clusters increases. In both cases 
the price falls because the production increases.  
 
 
3. Equilibrium 
Assume that the workers, either as a group or individually, can freely enter or exit a 
sector. Workers will enter a sector if they get higher income in that sector and they 
will exit if the income is higher in the other sector. This assumption ensures that we 
overcome the co-ordination problem. 
 
In the sectors with decreasing return to scale (the y-sector and the x-sector if it is not a 
cluster) the workers are paid according to the value of the marginal productivity of 
labour. Equilibrium in the labour market implies that the value of the marginal 
productivity of labour is equal in the sectors with decreasing return to scale. 
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If the x-sector is a cluster, each worker is paid according to the value of the average 
productivity in the sector. Equilibrium in the labour market is given by equality 
between the value of the marginal productivity in the y-sector and the average 
productivity in the cluster sector for each country hosting a cluster. Thus, 
summarising the equilibrium conditions in the labour market for each country that has 
a cluster gives 
 
  ì pX’(n)  if the x-sector is not a cluster 
(8) Y’(L-n) = í 
î pa(n)  if the  x-sector is a cluster. 
 
Equations (7) and (8) give the equilibrium. Equation (7) clears the goods markets and 
equation (8) clears the labour market. Combining the two gives one equilibrium 
condition: 
 
  ì P(n)X’(n)  if the x-sector is not a cluster 
(9) Y’(L-n)   = í 
î  F(k/K, n) a(n) if the x-sector is a cluster. 
 
In the following, we first analyse the equilibrium when the x-sector is not a cluster. 
Then we analyse the equilibrium when the x-sector is a cluster. 
  
Equilibrium when the x-sector is not a cluster 
When the x-sector is not a cluster, the equilibrium is illustrated in figure 1. 
 
 Figure 1: Equilibrium in the labour market when the x-sector is not a cluster 
 
 
In figure 1, a country’s labour force, L, is measured on the horizontal axis, and the 
return per worker is measured on the vertical axes. The x-sector is measured from the 
left corner and the y-sector from the right corner. The value of the marginal 
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productivity in the y-sector is given by the decreasing function Y’(L-n). The value of 
the marginal productivity in the x-sector is given by the decreasing function 
P(n)X’(n). Equilibrium is given by equality between the marginal productivity in the 
two sectors, illustrated by the point E. 
 
Equilibrium when the x-sector is a cluster 
The equilibrium in the labour marked when the x-sector is a cluster is illustrated in 
figure 2 for different values of p.  
 
 
 Figure 2: Equilibrium in the labour market when the x-sector is a cluster 
 
 
In figure 2, a country’s labour force, L, is measured on the horizontal axis, and the 
return per worker on the vertical axes. The x-sector is measured from the left corner 
and the y-sector from the right corner. The value of the marginal productivity in the y-
sector is given by the decreasing function Y’(L-n). The value of the average 
productivity in the x-sector is given by the increasing function pa(n). The larger p, the 
higher up in the diagram is the function pa(n). 
 
If the world market price is equal to p’, then there are two equilibria, B and C. The 
points B and C are equilibria because the return per worker is the same in both the x- 
and the y-sector, but only point C is a stable equilibrium.  
 
Another point in the diagram, the point A, characterises a situation where the total 
labour force in a country is employed in the y-sector. In point A  no single worker will 
have any incentives to switch to the x-sector. But a group of workers will have 
incentives to join the x-sector. A world market price equal to p’ will therefore induce 
an additional country to get a cluster. When the number of clusters in the world 
increases, the world market price will fall.  
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Free entry of clusters in the world will ensure that the number of clusters increases 
until the world market price is equal to p°. The equilibrium is given by the point E. 
Point E is characterised by a tangency between the value of the average productivity 
in the x-sector and the marginal productivity in the y-sector, that is 
 
(10) Y’’(L-n) = pa’(n) if the x-sector is a cluster. 
 
 
4. National income and incentives for industrial policy 
Assume for a moment that the government knows that the x-sector is a cluster. 
Comparisons of the national income between the countries show that those countries 
hosting a cluster have larger income than those without clusters. This is easily seen in 
figure 3.  
 
 Figure 3: The gains from a cluster 
 
 
In figure 3, equilibrium is given by point E. The employment in the cluster is given by 
N, and the employment in the y-sector is given by L-N. The value of the production in 
the cluster is illustrated by the rectangle ODEN, which is equal to Npa(N). The value 
of the production in the y-sector is given by the area below the function Y’(L-N) 
between L and N. Formally, income in a cluster country is given by equation (3) 
which implies that 
 
              
(11) m = ?L N Y’(L-z)dz + Npa(N) = Y(L-N) + Npa(N) if the x-sector is a cluster. 
 
Income in those countries without a cluster is equal to 
 
(12) m = ?L 0 Y’(L-z)dz = Y(L), 
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which in figure 2 can be illustrated by the total area below the Y’(L-n)-function. 
Clearly, this area is smaller than the area generated by the income in a cluster country. 
The shaded area in figure 2 illustrates the difference. A country with a cluster will 
therefore have a larger income than a country without a cluster. 
 
At first sight, it may seem that a group of workers could gain by creating a cluster. 
But, if an additional cluster appears, the world market price will fall. Individual 
workers will therefore prefer to work in the y-sector. A new cluster is thus not 
sustainable without help from the government. The question is whether the 
government in these countries would have an incentive to stimulate cluster creation.  
 
If the government can force the workers to stay in the cluster, national income will 
rise. An additional cluster in the world will reduce the world market price marginally. 
But still, the value of the production in the cluster will be higher than the value of the 
alternative production in the y-sector. The question is then: how can the government 
secure that workers stay in the cluster? 
 
Assume that the government offers the workers in the cluster a subsidy, s, financed by 
a lump sum tax. The workers will stay in the cluster sector if the equilibrium 
condition 
 
(13) Y’(L-n) = spa(n) 
 
is fulfilled.  
 
The total productivity in the cluster sector is equal to  
 
px = pna(n). 
 
The optimal subsidy is set such that the workers get paid according to the value of 
their marginal productivity in the cluster sector, which implies that 
 
(14) s*pa(n) = p[a(n) + na’(n)]. 
 
Equations (13) and (14) imply that the  value of the marginal productivity in the two 
sectors is equal, 
 
(15) Y’(L-n) = p[a(n) + na’(n)]. 
 
Since the countries are identical, all countries with a cluster have to subsidise the 
clusters. But how many clusters will there be? New clusters will enter as long as the 
income in a cluster country is larger than the income in a country without a cluster. 
When the income in the two groups of countries is identical, no further clusters will 
enter. This is so when 
 
(16) Y(L) = pna(n) + Y(L-n). 
 
The three equa tions (6), (15) and (16) give the policy equilibrium when the 
government knows that the x-sector is a cluster. Equation (6) gives equilibrium in the 
- 9 - 
market for goods, equation (15) gives equilibrium in the labour market, and equation 
(16) is a free entry condition for new cluster countries. The equilibrium is illustrated 
in figure 4. 
4
Per worker
return Per worker
return
Y´(L-n)
pa(n)
p[a(n)+na’(n)] = s*pa(n)
L
x-sector y-sectorn L-n
E*
 
Figure 4: The policy equilibrium when the x-sector is a cluster 
 
 
In figure 4, a country’s labour force, L, is measured on the horizontal axis, and the 
return per worker on the vertical axes. The x-sector is measured from the left corner 
and the y-sector from the right corner. The value of the marginal productivity in the y-
sector is given by the decreasing function Y’(L-n). The value of the average 
productivity in the x-sector is given by the increasing function pa(n), and the value of 
the marginal productivity is given by the function p[a(n) + na’(n)]. The workers 
receive a subsidy s* so that their average return including the subsidy is equal to the 
marginal return in both the x- and the y-sector. New countries will enter the x-sector 
as long as the national income is higher in countries with a cluster. In equilibrium the 
national income is the same in countries with clusters and in countries without 
clusters. In figure 4 the  equilibrium price is characterised by equality between the two 
shaded areas.  
 
 
5. Asymmetric information and industrial policy 
Summarising the results so far we have shown that the government in a country 
hosting a cluster will have incentives to subsidise the cluster if they know that the x-
sector is a cluster. This is the result from the study by Norman and Venables (2001). 
But if the government does not know whether the x-sector is a cluster or not, how 
should the government then design its policy? 
 
We have shown that if the x-sector is a cluster, then the optimal policy is a subsidy 
equal to s*. If the x-sector is not a cluster, then there is no market failure, and the 
optimal subsidy is equal to zero. In this simple model, the technology in each sector is 
not observable, but the employment in each sector is. A subsidy contingent of a 
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certain employment level will therefore induce the optimal scale of production. The 
first best policy with asymmetric information is thus 
 
 ì s* if n = n* 
(17) s  = í 
î 1 if n< n*. 
  
 
This gives a separating equilibrium. To prove that equation (17) gives a separating 
equilibrium, we need to show that a true cluster will choose the policy scheme (s*, 
n=n*). The cluster will obviously choose the combination (s*, n*), which is shown in 
the previous chapter. If they choose (1, n ¹ n*), the workers will not maximise their 
income in the cluster sector. In order to prove that equation (17) gives a separating 
equilibrium, we also have to show that the x-sector will not pretend to be a cluster if 
they are not so. That is, to show that the x-sector will choose the combination (1, 
n<n*) if it has decreasing return to scale. In figure 5 we have illustrated the 
equilibrium. The point E is the starting equilibrium when there is no industrial policy. 
Assume the x-sector is not a cluster. If it chooses the combination (s*, n=n*) their 
return per worker is given by the function s*P(n)X’(n) for n = n*; and if it chooses the 
combination (1, n< n*) its return per worker is given by the function P(n)X’(n) for n< 
n*. The equilibrium will be in point E as long as the point G is below the return in the 
y-sector (the point E*). 
 
5
Per worker
return Per worker
return
Y´(L-n)
L
x-sector y-sectorn L-nn*
s*P(n)X’(n)
G
E*
P(n)X’(n)
s*p*a(n)
pEa(n)
E
 
Figure 5: Equilibrium in the labour market with industrial policy and 
asymmetric information 
 
 
To prove that E is the only equilibrium if the x-sector is not a cluster, we have to show 
that point G is below point E* in figure 5. That is, the return per worker in an alleged 
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cluster is less than the return per worker in a true cluster when the employment is 
equal to n*, 
 
s*P(n*)X’(n*) < s*F(k*/K, n*) a(n*),  
 
which implies that 
 
(18) P(n*)X’(n*) < p*a(n*), 
 
where p* = F(k*/K, n*). 
 
Equation (18) requires that when n=n*, the return per worker is larger if the x-sector 
is a cluster. We can easily argue that this must be true. We have that 
 
(19) P(nE)X’(nE) = pEa(nE), 
 
where pE = F(kE/K, nE). 
 
We also have that 
 
(20) P(n*)X’(n*) < P(nE)X’(nE), 
 
since P’(n) < 0, X’’(n) < 0, and n* > nE. 
 
Combining equations (19) and (20) gives 
 
(21) P(n*)X’(n*) < pEa(nE). 
 
Assume that the production in the y-sector is given by 
 
(A1) Y = a + b( L-n ) - g(L-n)2/2 
 
so that 
 
 Y’ = b - g(L-n)  and Y’’ = - g. 
 
Furthermore, assume that the production in the x-sector is given by 
 
(A2) a(n) = nq,  q Î (0,1), 
 
and that the price is given by 
 
(A3) p = [nq+1 k/K]  –1. 
 
Appendix 2 shows that the assumptions (A1) – (A3) imply that 
 
(22) pE a(nE) = p* a(n*). 
 
Combining equations (21) and (22) gives 
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(23) P(n*)X’(n*) < p* a(n*), 
 
which proves equation (18). 
 
 
We have now shown that if the x-sector is a cluster, it will choose to receive the 
subsidy and employ n* workers. If the x-sector is not a cluster, it will choose not to 
receive the subsidy. Thus, equation (17) gives a separating equilibrium. 
 
 
6. Conclusions  
We have shown that in the presence of industrial clusters and asymmetric information 
there exists a policy that creates a separating equilibrium. The model which is used is 
very simple – it has only one input factor, which is immobile between the countries, 
all countries are identical, and the alternative production functions are common 
knowledge. All these assumptions imply that the model is very simple, and not very 
realistic. However, we have chosen this simple model to be able to focus on one 
problem at the time. And from this model, we can draw the following lesson: If the 
government wishes to subsidise an alleged cluster that can overcome the co-ordination 
problem, then the subsidy should be made contingent of a certain activity level. 
 
A lot of further research needs to be done. This paper may be a starting point. In 
addition to analysing how critical the simplifying assumptions are for the optimal 
scale problem, further research must also solve the co-ordination problem.  
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Appendix 1 
 
This appendix shows that the partial derivatives of p are negative. 
 
Total differentiation of equation (6) implies that 
 
 ì X(n)dn if the x-sector is not a cluster 
 -v’’(p)dp= í 
 î na(n)d(k/K)+(k/K)[a(n)+na’(n)]dn if the x-sector is a cluster. 
  
If the x-sector is not a cluster, then 
 
 ¶P/¶n = - X’(n)/v’’(p) < 0. 
      +    + 
 
If the x-sector is a cluster, then 
 
 ¶F/¶(k/K) = - na(n)/v’’(p) < 0 
   + + 
and 
 
 ¶F/¶n = - (k/K)[a(n) + na’(n)]/v’’(p) < 0. 
        +   +    +    + 
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Appendix 2 
 
The following example shows that the value of the average productivity in the x-
sector if the x-sector is a cluster, is equal in the equilibrium and in the optimum, that is 
 
(22) pE a(nE) = p* a(n*), 
 
where pE = F(kE/K, nE), and p* = F(k*/K, n*). 
 
Assume that the production in the y-sector is given by 
 
(A1) Y = a + b( L-n ) - g(L-n)2/2 
 
so that 
 
 Y’ = b - g(L-n)  and Y’’ = - g. 
 
Assume that the production in the x-sector is given by 
 
(A2) a(n) = nq,  q Î (0,1). 
 
and that the price is given by 
 
(A3) p = [nq+1 k/K]  –1. 
 
We find the optimal n* by dividing equation (16) by equation (15), that is 
 
(23) [Y(L) – Y(L-n)] / Y’(L-n) = [n a(n)] / [a(n) + n a’(n)]. 
 
With the specific functions (A1) and (A2), equation (23) becomes 
 
(24) [bn - ½ g n (2L - n)] / [b - g(L-n)] = n / (1 + q), 
 
which implies that 
 
(25) n* = 2q ( b - gL) / [g (1-q)]. 
 
The equilibrium allocation of labour, nE, is found by dividing equation (8) by equation 
(10), which gives 
 
(26) - [Y’(L-n) / Y’’(L-n)] = a(n) / a’(n). 
 
With the specific functions (A1) and (A2), equation (26) becomes 
 
(27) [b - g(L-n)] / g = nq / qnq-1 , 
 
which implies that 
 
(28) nE = q ( b - gL) / [g (1-q)]. 
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The ratio between the optimal and the equilibrium employment in the cluster is found 
by dividing equation (28) by equation (25), which gives 
 
(29) nE = ½ n*.  
 
The ratio between the optimal and the equilibrium employment in the cluster is 
independent of the demand-function. However, the number of clusters depends on the 
demand function. Equation (15) gives the optimal number of clusters, k*. Substituting 
the specific functions (A1) – (A3) into equation (15), gives 
 
(30) b - g(L-n*) = [(n*)q-1 k/K]  -1 [(n*)q + q(n*)q]. 
 
Substituting n* from equation (25) into equation (30) gives the optimal number of 
clusters, 
 
(31) k* = (gK/2q) [(1-q)/(b-gL)]2. 
 
The equilibrium number of clusters, kE, is found from equation (8). Substituting the 
specific functions (A1) – (A3) into equation (8) gives 
 
(32) b - g(L-nE) = [(nE)q-1 k/K]  -1 (nE)q. 
 
Substituting nE from equation (28) into equation (32) gives the equilibrium number of 
clusters, 
 
(33) kE = (gK/q) [(1-q)/(b-gL)]2. 
 
Dividing equation (31) into equation (33), we find the ratio between the equilibrium 
number of clusters and the optimal number of clusters, 
 
(34) kE = 2k*. 
 
With the specific functions (A2) and (A3), the value of the average productivity in 
optimum is given by 
 
(35) p* a(n*) = [(n*)q+1 k*/K] -1 (n*)q = K / (n* k*). 
 
The value of the average productivity in equilibrium is given by 
 
(36) pE a(nE) = [(nE)q+1 kE/K] -1 (nE)q = K / (nE kE). 
 
Substituting equations (29) and (34) into equation (36) gives 
 
(37) pE a(nE) = K / (n* k*). 
 
From equations (35) and (37) it is easily seen that the value of the average 
productivity in equilibrium and in optimum is equal. Thus, we have shown that 
equation (22) holds for the specific functions (A1) – (A3). 
 
